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An analysis is made of the allocation problem associated
with the conduct of ambush operations to interdict infil-
tration routes in a guerrilla-counterguerrilla environment.
A multi-stage two-person non-zero sum game is used to model
that allocation problem. It is shown that Lanchester's
equations can be used to develop a criterion function,
related to the casualty ratio, which demonstrates the
minimax property. The game is then solved to determine
the optimal allocations for both the guerrilla and the
counterguerrilla and the value of the game for two different
forms of the criterion function. The two results are com-
pared and the usefulness of the casualty ratio as a measure
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SUMMARY
This study addresses an allocation problem which occurs
frequently in the conduct of modern counterguerrilla cam-
paigns. These campaigns often include counter-infiltration
operations aimed at disrupting or destroying the lines of
communication between the guerrillas within the embattled
area and their political or military supporters in adjacent
areas. Often these operations are the responsibility of
the local military commanders of the areas through which
the infiltration is being effected, with those commanders
being limited as to the number and type of forces they
can commit. This thesis is an application of the mathemati-
cal theory of games to determine the optimal allocation of
ground forces for the conduct of ambush interdiction
operations
.
Section II is a general description of the infiltration
situation and a preliminary formulation of the problem as
a multi-stage non-zero sum game. The infiltration network
is idealized as a flow network and the operations of both
the insurgent and the counter-insurgent are studied for
only the arcs in the minimum cut set of the network which
are called infiltration routes. Each of these routes
constitutes one stage of a multi-stage game. At each stage
of the game the opponents each commit some portion of their
total resources to the route in question, receiving some
return which is a function of the commitments of both. The
overall return for a play of the game is therefore deter-
mined in part by the return from each stage, and the
principle of optimality is used to decompose the multi-
stage game into a sequence of single-stage games.
In Section III, Lanchester's equations of combat are
used to determine the combat outcome at each stage in terms
of the casualties sustained by the opposing forces. These
casualty functions are then used to define a criterion
function which is shown to possess the minimax property.
In addition, the stage transformations are derived for both
players. These functions are then used in Section IV to
formulate the game in its final form. After showing that
the method of decomposition is justifiable by demonstrating
the sufficient conditions, the game is solved. It is shown
that the optimal strategy for the insurgent, if he wishes
to minimize the criterion or casualty ratio, is to commit
no forces to the infiltration network at all, and the opti-
mal strategy for the counter-insurgent is to play any
possible strategy.
Section V is an extension of the original model to more
nearly account for the insurgent's true goal of maximizing
the forces successfully infiltrated through the network.
A new individual return for the insurgent is used to define
a new criterion function. This criterion is then used to
solve the game for the special case in which the initial
forces of the opposing players are strategically or
Lanchester equivalent. It is shown that the optimal
strategy for both players is to commit their entire initial
forces to a randomly selected route, choosing each route
with equal probability. It is also shown that this strategy
virtually insures that the insurgent will successfully
infiltrate a major portion of his force.
The discussion in Section VI is concerned primarily with
the applicability of the assumptions made in reducing the
allocation problem to a game of strategy. The results of
the two formulations suggest that the casualty ratio is not
a true measure of the effectiveness of the counterinsurgent
in limiting the infiltration through the network. In addi-
tion, the possible extension of the general method to
situations with a number of dissimilar operational alterna-
tives should be of interest, along with comparable exten-
sions to games with positive critical survivor levels and
games of partial information.
Included as Appendix A is the formulation and proof of
an extended theorem of continuous games which insures that
the criterion function used in the paper demonstrates the
minimax property. The theorem could also be of use in the




A major objective in the conduct of military operations
in an insurgent environment is that of limiting the facility
with which the insurgents maintain the lines of communica-
tion between their sanctuaries and their areas of operation.
This paper describes an application of the mathematical
theory of games to the study of the allocation problem
involved in mounting ambush interdiction operations along
guerrilla infiltration routes. Before formulating the
model, the rationale behind the approach used will be
explained and the aim of the study will be detailed.
A. THE COUNTER-INFILTRATION PROBLEM
Interdiction operations are designed to disrupt or
curtail the enemy's use of its lines of communication and
supply. Although historically of secondary importance,
interdiction and harrassment are distinctive character-
istics of unconventional or guerrilla warfare. With the
increasing number of guerrilla conflicts of the last two
decades these tactics have become especially important
since they have required the expenditure of a dispropor-
tionate part of the total military effort involved in con-
ducting successful counter-insurgency campaigns.
The insurgent maintains the initiative in most guerrilla
conflicts. Organized in small, highly mobile groups, the
insurgent unit can choose to strike only when it has
overwhelming, though momentary, superiority of force.
When outnumbered or under pressure the same unit usually
disbands to disguise itself among the normal populace of
its area of operations. To maintain any significant level
of activity, however, the unit must receive logistical
and command support from its parent organization.
The insurgent logistical base and the target area of
operations are seldom contiguous. The former is ideally
located in some area or sanctuary which is inaccessible to
the counter-insurgent due to political or physical limita-
tions, while the latter is within the political sphere of
the counter-insurgent. These two areas are usually separ-
ated by a border area characterized by extremely difficult
terrain and sparse population. Though of little tactical
interest, this area is strategically important to both
antagonists. The insurgent relies on the use of this area
for the infiltration of men and materiel and the exfiltra-
tion of casualties and intelligence in support of operations
in his target area. The relative ease with which these
infiltration operations can be exposed and interdicted make
the same area a prime target for the counter-insurgent
operations
.
Military experience in Malaysia, Algeria and Vietnam
has shown that the insurgent traffic tends to be concen-
trated on a small number of routes through these border
areas [12, 14]. This is a result of the difficulty of
the terrain, which limits the flow capacity of unimproved
routes, and of the limited resources and communications
capability of the insurgent. In Malaysia the communist
terrorists consistently used a few well-defined routes
even in an open jungle which offered no limitations to
movement, seemingly out of habit [8]. This channeling of
the insurgent logistical effort increases the effectiveness
of properly conducted interdiction operations in this
border area.
Although interdiction alone seldom eliminates the
insurgent threat it has been a principal factor in the
conduct of all recent successful counter-insurgent cam-
paigns [11]. Effective interdiction imposes on the insur-
gent an immediate loss in personnel and supplies. More
important, the operational effectiveness of the insurgent
force in the target area of operations is lowered, reducing
the level of conflict and increasing the vulnerability of
the insurgent in this area. Finally, if completely sealed
off from its support due to total interdiction of the lines
of communication, the insurgent force must often cease
offensive operations and concentrate on survival.
The interdiction tactics which have been employed in
these situations have been varied, including long-range
artillery bombardment, air interdiction, and ground opera-
tions of varied types. One of the most effective tactics
has been the use of ambushes along the supply routes.
The very channeling noted above makes these routes extremely
vulnerable to attack by wel organized and well-armed ambush-
ing forces. Furthermore, the tactical advantage provided
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by the planned ambush multiplies the effective size of the
ambushing force, enabling it to achieve results far out of
proportion to the actual resources employed. The importance
of the ambush is recognized in the operational doctrine of
most modern insurgent and counter-insurgent forces, for
the same factors which make the ambush a tactic of choice
for the insurgent make it an effective means of combatting
him.
The allocation problem involved in conducting ambush
operations to interdict guerrilla infiltration routes is
one of allocating the military resources available among
the possible ambush sites or supply routes. The lack of
any formal planning model for the conduct of these opera-
tions and their importance in current military planning
make the problem a valid subject of study.
B. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
The object of this paper is to develop a method of
optimally allocating ground forces for the conduct of
ambush operations. The problem will first be formulated
as a two-person, multi-stage game. An attempt will then
be made to determine a realistic payoff function for the
game, and the applicability of the zero-sum assumption will
be examined. The solution to the game will be determined
to yield the value of the game and the optimal strategies
for both antagonists. The sensitivity of the solution to
11
some of the assumptions will be investigated and some
extensions of the method of approach proposed.
To facilitate the solution of the problem the formula-
tion and proof of an extended min-max theorem for a certain
class of continuous games is necessary. The complete
statement and proof of the theorem will be included in
Appendix A along with a brief commentary on its possible
future applications.
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II. THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM AS A GAME
A military commander with tactical responsibility for
an area through which infiltration is being effected faces
the problem of allocating his resources for interdiction
to maximize their effect. The nature of the allocation
process and the difficulties in analyzing it will be
studied in detail, and a simple introduction to the idea
of a game of strategy will be made. A general formulation
of the allocation process as a game will be followed by an
explanation and justification of the assumptions made in
the formulation. The concept of a return or payoff will
be introduced in the general sense with the actual specifi-
cation of the function being made In a later chapter.
A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The allocation process to be discussed differs from
that of most current allocation models such as those form-
ulated by Bellman [2] and Danskin [4]. Consider the
problem faced by the counter-insurgent. His task is that
of simultaneously allocating some limited resources among
a number of feasible alternatives in an attempt to maximize
some return. This return is a function not only of the
resources he commits to the different ventures, but also of
the resources committed by his opponent, the insurgent, to
counter these operations. The insurgent is also attempting
to maximize some return which may not be related to that
13
of the counter-insurgent in a manner which facilitates
mathematical analysis. The resources involved are usually
military forces or hardware, and the return is some measure
of the harm done to the opponent or his cause.
The major differences between this allocation process
and some of the current allocation models lie in the assump-
tions made about the time frame and information transmission
involved. Danskin's model [4] is representative in that
it assumes that the actions of the two antagonists are
sequential and distinct and that the second player has
perfect knowledge of the play made by his opponent and
responds accordingly. However, in the situation currently
studied these assumptions are seldom valid. Both the
insurgent and the counter-insurgent must mount operations
in the border area on a day-to-day basis. The two allo-
cations are simultaneous in nature since the time lapse
between them is usually too short to permit either combat-
ant to take advantage of any knowledge obtained about the
other's current allocation. Furthermore, such information
is seldom current, at best imperfect and can only be used
to determine a very rough a priori distribution on the
possible allocations of the. opponent
.
The major similarity between the ambush allocation
problem and the models mentioned above is that the military
allocation problem has all of the aspects of a game of
strategy since there are two opponents with divergent aims,
14
each with the ability to determine in part the return of
his adversary. A brief introduction to the theory of
games will be used to introduce the notation employed in
the formulation.
B. GAMES OP STRATEGY
The theory of games of strategy is a mathematical
theory of competitive decision-making. Games of strategy
and games of pure chance differ in that only in the former
can the participant bring any influence to bear on the
outcome of an event. As a result, intelligence and skill
can be useful in the play of games of strategy.
As it is used in this report, the word game will denote
a set of rules for conducting a decision process, while
the word play will refer to a particular realization of the
process. The participants of the game will be called
players , and the points in a game at which one of the
players picks an alternative action will be referred to as
stages while the actual alternative selected will be called
a choice . The payment which the players receive from a
play of the game will be called the return or payoff .
Games can be either single-stage or multi-stage games, ,
with a multi-stage game being one in which there is more
than one choice made by the players in a single play of
the game. Games are also classified according to certain
characteristics, such as the number of players and the form
of payoff. The class of interest will be the class of
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two-person, infinite games. There are two players in a
game of this class, and the choices of the players are
made from infinite sets. The result of a play of the game
is a payoff which is a function of the choices made by
both players. When the choices are limited to the
closed interval [0, 1], the game is said to be continuous.
In continuous games the players choose from [0, 1] by
means of probability distribution functions which are
called strategies . A game is said to be zero sum if there
is no change in the total resources in the player system
during a play of the game, that is, when the payoff to
any player is made by another player in the game.
For a two-person zero sum continuous game, let the
payoff be M and let one player choose a number x from
[0, 1] by means of a distribution function F. Let the
other player choose a number y from [0, 1] by means of a
distribution function G. The expected payoff to the first
player is defined as
1 1
E(F,G) = f f M(x,y) dF(x) dG(y).
If, for a continuous two-person zero sum game, the
values





= Min Max E(F,G)
G P
both exist and are equal, their common value is called the
value of the game, and the distribution functions F and
G which vield this common value are called the optimal
o
J —*
strategies for the respective players. A game is said to
be solved when the value of the game and the optimal
strategies have been determined [71-
C. FORMULATION OF THE GAME
In the formulation which follows the terminology
developed above will be used freely. Notation will be
introduced and defined as it is needed.
1 . Scenario
The infiltration routes through a border area can
be represented by a network as shown in Figure 1. The
insurgent attempts to move men and supplies from the
sanctuary area through the network into the area of opera-
tions, or in the reverse direction. The counter-insurgent
attempts to stop this flow by mounting ambushes along the
arcs of the network. It will be assumed that both the
insurgent and the counter-insurgent have complete knowledge
of the entire network, and that all of the arcs in the net-
work are equally accessible to both.
In any network there is at least one set of arcs whose











































from the sink or destination. Such a set of arcs is called
a cut set , and the cut set with the fewest number of arcs of
all the cut sets of a given network is called the minimum
cut set . By operating along all of the arcs of a cut set
the counter-insurgent can control the flow through the net-
work, and by operating along the minimum cut set he can
control the flow with the least expenditure of his resources,
if it is assumed that all arcs are equally accessible and
suitable for the ambush operations. For allocation purposes
then, the entire network can be replaced by a network con-
sisting only of simple arcs from the sanctuary area to the
destination or target area, with the number of arcs in the
new network being equal to the number of arcs in the minimum
cut set of the original network.
For the present model the arcs in the modified network
will be called infiltration routes . It will be assumed that
there is no limit on the flow along these routes and that
they are all equally capable of being ambushed successfully
by the counter-insurgent force. The allocation of the
forces of both the insurgent and the counter-insurgent to






The allocation game will be described in the follow-
ing manner. Let the counter-insurgent commander be Player A,
and let the insurgent be Player B, and let the initial
resource constraint for the two players be A and B
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respectively. Let the number of infiltration routes through
the border area be n. At each play of the game Player A
chooses a vector.
r - (flf r2 . .... f± . .... fn )
from a set A, and Player B chooses a vector
from a set r, where both A and T lie in Euclidean n-space
and where f. and g. are the forces allocated by the respec-
tive players to the i route. The sets described are,
n
A = {fl Z f. < A, f. > 0}
1=1 1 ~ i "
n
r = {g| Z gjL <_ B, g, > 0}i=l 1
As a result of the allocation Player A receives a payoff of
R(f,g; A,B) and Player B a payoff of R'(f,g; A,B). To
simplify notation, R(f,g; A,B) will be written as R(f,g).
For the present it will be assumed that R(f,g) is continuous
over A and r and that
R(f,g) + R'(f,g) =
that is, that the process is zero sum. The value of the
game described is given by the expression
20
v = Max Min ff R(f,d) d F'(f) d G'(g)
n
P' G'
= Min Max // R(f,d) d F'(f) d G'(g)
,
G' F'
where F' and G' are distribution functions over A and T res-
pectively. These distribution functions are complicated in
form and will not be rigorously defined at present.
3. Two Modifications
Although both players distribute their forces over
the n routes simultaneously the problem is simplified con-
siderably by assuming the process is sequential in nature
and that the game is a multi-stage game. The play is
assumed to begin with a first stage at which each player
selects a route. For simplicity each is assumed to select
the same route, which is arbitrarily given the index one.
The players then allocate a certain quantity of their
resources to the route, Player A choosing f-, and Player B
choosing g-. where <_ f, <_ A and <_ g, <_ B. There are two
consequences of this first choice. Player A receives a
payoff of R(f-|i g-.) and Player B receives -R(f-.,g-.). At the
same time, there is a reduction in the available resources
of both players, with A being transformed into T(f-.,g-.) and
B becoming S(f-,,g-.). The game continues in like fashion
for (n-1) additional stages.
At the end of the n moves the total return to Player A




s 2 ' •••» n ' ^1 ' Sp> • • • s Sn /
n
2 R(f, ,g,) •
i=l
It is assumed that R(f,g), T(f,g) and S(f,g) are continuous
functions of f and g for all finite f and g and that these
are functions only of the allocations and resource con-
straints, not of the route in question.
To further simplify the computational procedures we can
represent the allocations of both players to any infiltra-
tion route in terms of the proportion of their total
resources which each commits. Define the linear transfor-
mations
X = X(A) = |(A)
X = Y(D = |(r).
Then the new sets X and Y are seen to be
n
X = {xl Z x. < 1; x. > 0}
i=l x
n




and if U denotes the n-dimensional unit space, then X < U
n ^ ' — n
and Y < U . The game can now be formulated as a process
— n &
22
of allocating portions of the total force available to the
various routes.
4 . Modified Formulation
Using the simplifications introduced above the allo-
cation game can now be reformulated in a convenient manner.
Define the class of n-dimensional probability distribution
functions D as
n
D (w) = D (w-, , w n , .... w )n n l 3 2' ' n
= Prob(W-, < w n , W n < w„ , . . . , W < w )1 — I s 2 — 2 ' s n — n
where D satisfies the following conditions:
n °
(i) for any weU
,




(0 s 0, ..., 0) =
D
n
(l, 1, ..., .1) - 1
(iii) D is a non-decreasing function in w. for
i = 1,2,. .
.
,n
(Iv) If 1 is the n-dimensional sum vector, then
for all real 6 > 0,
lim D (W+61) = D (w)
.
6-0 n n
When the return function is developed it will be shown
that the value of the game, v , depends only upon two attri-
tion coefficients and upon the initial resources of the two




(A,B) = vk k= 1, 2, ,.,, n,
can be used to reduce the problem of solving the original
n-stage game to one of solving n single-stage continuous
games. This reduction is made possible by a decomposition
technique which is based on a fundamental principle of
dynamic programming stating that an optimal policy for a
sequential decision process has the property that whatever
the initial state and initial decision of the process, the
remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with
regard to the state resulting from the first decision.
This principle of optimality has been shown by Bellman to
be as valid for game purposes as it is for one-person
decision processes [2] . Applying this principle to the






(A,B) = Max Min / / R(x,y) dP(x) dG(y)
P G
1 1
= Min Max / / R(x,y) dP(x) dG(y)
G POO
1 1




= Min Max / / [R(x,y) + h. (T,S ) ] dP(X)dG(y)
G P
where P, G e D .
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The decomposition concept introduced above can be used
to solve the general problem if the return function R(x,y)
and the transformation functions T(x,y) and S(x,y) are
well behaved and if certain other mathematical conditions
are satisfied. These properties and conditions will be
demonstrated after the form of the return function has been
determined. Before attempting to derive an appropriate
payoff some of the assumptions inherent in the formulation
will be examined.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
There were a number of assumptions made, both tacitly
and explicitly, in developing the game formulation of the
problem. The major assumptions dealt with the tactical
nature of the conflict along the infiltration routes and
were based primarily on actual military experience.
The area of operations for both antagonists was assumed
to be limited to the designated area of tactical responsi-
bility of the counter-insurgent player. The infiltration
network through this area was assumed to be finite and
undirected, with an infinite capacity on all the arcs. The
number of routes used for planning purposes by both par-
ticipants was assumed to be the number of arcs in the mini-
mum cut set of the network. Along these arcs, the combat
activities of the insurgent player were limited to defensive
operations, and the counter-insurgent player was limited
specifically to the conduct of ambush operations.
25
The planning period for the problem was assumed to be
short, not longer than one day. This assumption permitted
the analysis of the long-range allocation problem as a
sequence of independent, short-range problems, each con-
stituting a separate play of the game. It was further
assumed that any replacements or casualties affected only
the resources available for allocation at the start of
each play, and those resources were assumed to be limited.
Since the planning period for most tactical operations of
this type is usually short and since a military commander
is limited in the forces at his disposal, these assumptions
do not seem unreasonable.
The flow through the network was assumed to be measur-
able in terms of the number of men infiltrated during a
planning period. Most infiltration operations in support
of guerrilla operations rely almost exclusively on human
bearers for the transport of supplies, especially if the
terrain in the area is difficult or if the infiltration
operations are being interdicted by the opposing side.
This assumption permits an intuitively reasonable evaluation
of the return to either side in a play of the game, which
will be developed in the next section together with the
transformation functions which affect the resources avail-
able to the players at each stage of the game.
26
III. THE RETURN FUNCTION
The formulation up to this point has utilized only a
general specification of the payoff or return function with
many of the properties of this function being assumed.
The return function used in this study will now be developed
and its properties explored.
Obtaining a realistic measure of effectiveness in con-
ducting a counter-guerrilla campaign has consistently been
a problem in itself. The traditional measures used to judge
success in ground combat seldom apply to insurgent conflifts,
since a successful counter-guerrilla campaign usually
includes sociological and psychological programs which are
not as important in conventional warfare. A true measure
of effectiveness for counter-insurgency would probably take
into account all of these factors.
The most common measure of effectiveness applied to the
outcome of the purely military conflicts of recent counter-
guerrilla operations has been the casualty ratio. A mili-
tary commander today is presumed to be justified in sustain-
ing heavy casualties to his own force if proportionately
larger casualties are inflicted on the enemy, while a
commander who suffers losses without inflicting greater
harm on the adversary is judged a poor commander, regardless
of the relative importance of the engagements in the overall
conflict. Since the purpose of this study is to provide
the military commander with a realistic planning model, the
27
casualty ratio will be accepted as a measure of effectiveness
without further justification. The technique used to deter-
mine a functional representation of the casualty ratio will
be an application of Lanchester's equations.
A. LANCHESTER CONSIDERATIONS
The casualty rate of both forces involved in an ambush
was modeled by Deitchman [51 using Lanchester's equations.
Let the initial strength of the ambushing force be f and
that of the ambushed force g. The differential equations







where a and 3 are the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients
for the forces of Player A and Player B, respectively,
operating along some arbitrary infiltration route in the
area of operations.
By multiplying both equations by appropriate factors,
the left hand sides of the relations can be equated. Sub-
sequent integration of both sides yields the relation
(f
o
- V fc*l " & >
where f, and g, represent the strengths of each force at
time t (with f = f. and g = g.), and the condition for
o 1 °o toi '





If in a conflict either initial force is less than that
required for parity, that force will be assumed to lose the
engagement
.
In his study of ambush situations in guerrilla warfare
Deitchman notes that the attrition rate coefficients usually
differ by orders of magnitude. Both are basically kill
probabilities, with
3 = r fp
where r f is the rate of fire of the ambusher's weapons and






where r is the rate of fire of the ambushed forces weapons,
A is the single-round area of effectiveness of those
weapons, and A f is the area into which the force is firing.
If rates of fire are equal on both sides a/23 can be on the
order of 1/1000 or smaller [5].
B. CASUALTY FUNCTIONS
The preceding equations can now be used to determine
the casualties for both sides involved in an ambush as a
function of the initial force strengths. The combat is
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begun with Player B sending some of his force, g , along
the ambushed infiltration route, and with Player A ambushing
with some of his force, f . The combat is assumed to con-
' o
tinue until the number of survivors of the ambushing force
diminishes to some critical value m, or until the number
of survivors of the ambushed force diminishes to n. The
side whose strength first reaches the critical value loses;
the other side wins the engagement. If t is the time at
which the losing force reaches this critical value, the
casualties for each side can be easily determined. Define
the casualties for the insurgent force as
cB (f ,g ) = S - g T
and those for the counter-insurgent force as
C
A
(f0>6 > - fo " f T •
The expressions for f and g , the terminal force strengths
for each side, can be determined directly from the relation
derived in the preceding section.
From the definition of the critical values, m and n, it
can be seen that these are the maximum force strengths at
which either side will break contact and retire from the
engagement. Since the use of positive critical values
complicates the development considerably, it will be assumed
that both m and n are zero. Then there are four different
conditions of initial forces f and g which are of interest.
o °o
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1. If either force meets no opposition, that is, if
f = or g =
o °o
then there will be no engagment and no casualties and
C
n
(f,g)=Cn (f,g)=0.A o J&o B o &o
2. If the initial force ratio of the combatants is
f > — ff
2
o 23 So
then the combat will result in a win for the ambushing
force. From the definition of a win given earlier, this
implies that the ambushed force is completely wiped out,











,g ) = [gQ - 0] - gQ .
3. If the parity condition
_a_ 2
o 23 So
holds, then neither side will win. The two forces will
exactly cancel each other, with the casualties suffered
by each side being equal to the force employed, and
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C.(f ,g ) = fA o &o o
C
B (fo^ ) " g
H. If the ambushing force is inferior to the force
being ambushed so that
f < — e- 2
o 2$ s
then the engagement will result in a loss for the ambushing
force, and therefore
C.(f ,g ) = f .A o* &o o






^ (g +g T )(g -g T )
2T i go W^o* " [CB (fo ,go )] 2_
The solution of this equation is
c
B
(f0> g ) - g -/8§ - f f
When the allocations of the two players are made in
terms of a proportion of their total resources committed
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to each route, the expected casualties resulting from such
a commitment can also be determined as the fraction of the
total force lost in the engagement. These proportions x.
and y. of their total resources allocated by the players
to the i infiltration route are
x. = (1/A) f
1 y o
y. = (1/B) gQ ,





i " 23 T y i '
It is obvious that the relation between x. and y. differs
from the relations developed for f and g only by a con-
stant of proportionality which depends on the total initial
resources, A and B, of the two players.
The Lanchester attrition rate coefficients of the two
forces, a and 3, will be assumed constant over time. This
assumption is not made purely out of mathematical necessity,
since military forces tend to react during military encoun-
ters in ways which are characteristic of the units involved.
The area occupied by an ambusher, the rate of fire of
weapons, and the single-shot kill probabilities of those
weapons are usually similar from engagement to engagement.
Since the attrition coefficients are dependent on these
factors the coefficients also tend to be constant over time.
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When the attrition coefficients are constant, the factor
of proportionality is a function of only the initial
resource parameters, A and B and this factor can be defined
as
k = k(A,B) =
^g- — •
The casualty functions for Player A and B can now be deter-
mined for an ambush to which the players commit only por-
tions of their total force. If the portion committed by
Player A is x and that of Player B is y, the casualty
functions for each side, C.(x,y) and CR (x,y), are summarized
in Table I.
TABLE I
CASUALTY FUNCTIONS FOR x,ye [0,1]
CR (x,y)Range C A (x,y)
x=0 or y=0
2
x < Ky X
2





/ 2y-/y -(1/k) x
y
y
C. THE RETURN FUNCTION
Using the casualty functions developed above, an expres-
sion for the casualty ratio associated with the choices of





for all x,y > .
If the minimax decision rule is applicable to this problem
as was assumed earlier it would seem logical for Player A
to wish to maximize this ratio, while Player B should wish
to minimize it. A difficulty arises from the zero sum
assumption made in the game formulation. The return func-
tion proposed above is a non-zero sum function, as the
(negative) return to each side, the casualties suffered, is
not provided by the opposing side. Therefore the total
resources available at the end of a play of the game are
less than those before the play.
One method of analyzing non-zero sum games is to intro-
duce a dummy player who receives a payoff equivalent to
the total resources lost by the other players [7]- This
approach would complicate the current problem considerably,
since a unique definition of the solution of an n-person
game does not exist for n greater than two [3 S 15]. Instead,
it will be shown that the return function proposed, though
not zero sum, can be adjusted to make the minimax principle
apply. This can be accomplished by applying an extension
of the fundamental theorem of continuous games.
1
.
The Extended Theorem of Continuous Games
The following theorem is an extension of a similar
theorem for discrete (matrix) games.
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Theorem. Let F and G be functions such that F,G£D,,
where D-, is the class of univariate probability distribu-
tion functions defined in Section II. If M(x 5 y) and
N(x,y) are two arbitrary continuous functions over the
closed unit square and if
I 1
/ / N(x,y) dF(x) dG(y) > d >
for all F,GeD , then
II 11
f / M(x,y) dF(x) dG(y) / / M(x,y) dF(x) dG(y)
Max Min Min Max
/ / N(x 5 y) dF(x)dG(y) / / N(x,y) dF(x) dG(y)
The proof of the theorem involves a variation of a mul-
tiple approximation technique developed by Bellman [2]
.
The proof is lengthy and contributes little to the present
development and consequently will not be detailed at the
present time. It is included as Appendix A of this report.
2 . Modified Casualty Function
The expected casualty functions can easily be modi-
fied to conform to the conditions of the theorem. It can be
readily verified that both C.(x,y) and C R (x,y) are continu-
ous functions over their range of definition and thus
satisfy the first condition of the theorem. However, the
second condition states that the integral of the function
in the denominator must be positive over all possible values
in its range. This condition is not satisfied if either
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Player A or Player B uses as a strategy a probability step














1 (x) = 1 for x > 0.
o
However, the original casualty function C.(x,y) can be used





where d is a positive real number. It can be readily seen
that this new function satisfies the requirements for the
denominator of the return ratio specified by the theorem.
Although this new function was arbitrarily defined to
make the problem tractable, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the ambushing force experiences some small constant
loss regardless of the level of hostilities. This loss is
often a consequence of the area of operations itself and
may be a result of disease or accidental causes.
3 . Final Form
The return function which will be used in the final
formulation and solution of the problem will be
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CR (x ,y )





This function will be applied recursively to the successive
stages or routes of the planning problem in the manner
outlined in Section II.
D. THE TRANSFORMATION FUNCTIONS
At each stage of the allocation game there is an alter-
ation in the resources available to each player which is
a function of the allocation made at that stage. This
alteration has been represented symbolically with the
transformation functions T(A,B) and S(A,B). The form of
these transformation functions will now be determined.
When each player makes his choice at a stage of the
game there is an upper limit to the forces he can commit
at that stage which is the amount of uncommitted resources
he still has. Let the uncommitted resources available to
Player A at the start of stage i be a. , and let those
available to Player B at that stage be b.. The reduction
in these resources as a result of the allocation made by
each player to stage i then determines the resources
available for subsequent stages of the game. This trans-
formation is then











= b. - y.





All of the Information necessary for the complete formu-
lation is now available. In the next section the problem
will be restated using the return functions and stage trans-
formations outlined above, and the resulting equations will
be used to determine the optimal allocation policy.
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IV. THE METHOD OF SOLUTION
The individual returns and stage transformations devel-
oped in the preceding section will now be used to state the
allocation problem in its final form. After showing that
the method of decomposition can be applied to the problem,
the n-stage allocation game will be solved and the optimal
allocation strategies for each player will be determined.
The general method of solution is to apply the decomposition
principle outlined in Section II to transform the serial
n-stage allocation problem into n equivalent single-stage
allocation problems.
A. FINAL PROBLEM STATEMENT
The allocation problem discussed in the earlier sections
can be briefly restated as follows. Two opponents, an
insurgent and a counter-insurgent, operate in an area
through which there are exactly n supply routes. The insur-
gent uses these supply routes to infiltrate men through the
area, and the counter-insurgent uses the routes to ambush .
the insurgents. Both players wish to allocate their forces
to the n routes in an optimal manner.
In an earlier section the problem was shown to be
similar to a multi-stage game. Each stage i in the game is
a move at which the two players simultaneously allocate a
thportion of their forces to operate on the i infiltration
route. The allocations the two players make reduce the
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resources they have available for subsequent allocations
and determine the returns they each receive from that route
This process continues for the n moves or stages which
constitute a play of the game, and at the end of the play
the players receive a return which is a function of the
return from each stage of the game. Each player wishes to
allocate his forces at each stage so as to maximize his
overall return for a play of the game.
This sequential decision problem can be pictorially
represented as in Figure 2. At each stage i of the game
the input state variables are the current uncommitted
resources, a. and b., available to the counter-insurgent
and the insurgent, respectively. The decision variables,
x. and y., are the allocations of each of the players, and
the returns, C
fl
. and CR ., are the casualties sustained by
each. The stage transformations, T. and S^, are the reduc-
tions in available resources resulting from the allocations
of each player.
By the principle of optimality, any optimal set of
allocations for either player has the property that, what-
ever the decision made at any stage of the process, the
remaining set of decisions must be optimal with respect to
the outcome of that decision. This principle will be used
to decompose the n-stage allocation game into n equivalent
single stage games, and the solution to the overall game

































































The recursive equations which will be used to solve the
allocation game are similar to those of Section II, but
these incorporate the return functions and stage transfor-
mations obtained in Section III.
The casualty function derived earlier for the insurgent
force can be used to define a recurrence relation. Let the
return to the insurgent at any stage be the sum of the
individual return from the allocations made at that stage
and the return to the insurgent at the preceding stage.
Therefore
,
CB1 (A,B) = CB (x 1 ,y 1 ;A,B)
CB1 (A,B) = CB (x1 ,y 1 ;A,B) + CB1 _ 1 [S(x1 ,y1 ;A 9 B)]
for i = 2,3, ... ,n .
In a similar manner a sequence can be defined for the
counter-insurgent as
C
A1 (A,B) = CA (x 1 ,y 1 ;A,B)
C
A1 (A,B) = CA (x i ,y 1 ;A,B) +
C
Ai _ 1 [T(x 1 ,y.;A,B)]
for i = 2 ,3, . . . ,n
and
C
A1 (A,B) = CA1 (A,B) + d for i = 1,2,. . . ,n .
The recurrence equations for the n-stage game can then be
given by
^3
h_ (A,B) = Max Min R, (A,B)
P G
1 1
/ / C Rn (A,B)dF(x-, )dG(y,
)
= Max Min
/ / C* (A,B)dF(x
n
)dG( yi )A1 1




/ / C (A,B)dF(x )dG(y )
= Max Min
/ / C* (A,B)dF(x. )dG(y.)
wh
7?
ere C,-,.(A,B) and C„.(A,B) are as defined above and whereBi ' Ai s
T(x. ,y . ;A,B) = a. - x.l iJ l ' ' l l










,a. ,b . > .
l >0 l ' l ' l —
This set is similar to the usual recursive equations of
dynamic programming, and its recursive solution, starting
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with i = 1 and continuing through i = n, yields the optimal
n-stage return
v = h (A.B) = Max Min R (A,B)
n rr a p Q n
v
»
where R (A,B) is by definition the overall casualty ratio
for the n routes. In addition, the solution yields the
optimal strategies F and G for the two antagonists.^ t> to
When the decomposition technique was first proposed in
Section II it was assumed that its application was valid
for the allocation problem being studied. Before attempting
a solution using the decomposition technique its applica-
bility will be verified by demonstrating the sufficient
condition for decomposition given by Mitten [9].
B. GENERALIZED COMPOSITION
To justify the decomposition of the n-stage allocation
process the crucial step of moving the optimization with
th
respect to x ^, . . . ,x. ,y 1 , . . . ,y, inside the n stage
return must be achieved. A sufficient condition for
accomplishing this change in the position of optimization
has been given by Mitten [9] . Since the Mitten condition
applies to pure maximization problems the condition will
be demonstrated separately for each player.
The problem of the maximizing player, Player A, will
first be considered for a two-stage process. The objective
function at stage two is
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1 1





B) = Max Min ^-^
P G
/ / C* (A s B)dF(x 9 )dG(y„)A ^ d d
1 1
/ / [CB (x 2 ,y 2 ,a2 ,b2)+CB (x 1 ,y 1 ,a 1 ,b 2 -y2)]dP(x 2 )dG(y 2 )
























Let G be the distribution function which optimizes this
o ^
function for Player B. Then
1 1































cR ( x -i>y-i) is monotonic nondecreasing in x, , Hp(A,B,G ) is
monotonic nondecreasing in x
1
, which is the sufficient
condition derived by Mitten for optimal decomposition of a
maximization process. This result can be easily extended
to the n-stage case, and the validity of decomposition for
Player A is verified.
Consider the problem now of the minimizing player.,
Player B. Recall from the theorem of Section III
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h p (A,B) = Max Min R ? (A,B)d
F G
= Min Max R ? (A,B)
G F
Let F be the distribution which maximizes R_,(A,B) for
o d
Player A. Then








But, considering the form of Hp(A,B,F ) given in the deriva-
tion for the maximizing player it can be seen that, since
C R (x.. ,y, ) is monotonically nonincreasing in y, , and since
C
fl
(x-,,y-.) is monotonically nondecreasing in y. , Hp(A,B,F )
is monotonically nonincreasing in y-, . Therefore,
-Hp(A,B,F ) is monotonically nondecreasing in y-, , which is
again a sufficient condition for decomposition. The valid-
ity of the decomposition technique is therefore verified
for the n-stage allocation game being studied.
C. SOLUTION
The n-stage allocation game will now be solved by solv-




(A,B) = Max Min R, (A,B)
F G
1 1
/ / C (A,B)dF(X )dG(y )
= Max Min ^^y^
F G / / C*(A s B)dF(x n )dG(y n )R
1 1
/ / CR (x n ,y n ;K)dF(x n )dG(y,
)





















, y > /- X
k = k(A,B) = 23" — •





It is readily obvious that there exists a unique minimum
for R, (A,B) which is attained at y, = 0. The distribution
function G, , where G-, is the marginal distribution of x-,
in the distribution function G-, is given by











/ / CB (x 1 ,y 1 ;K) dP(x 1 )dI o (y 1 )
h
1
(A,B) = Max ^~j
/ / [C.(x





The optimal strategy for Player B at the first stage Is
to employ no forces, with probability one . This implies that
the insurgent should not use the first infiltration route
at all if he wishes to minimize the casualty ratio over all
of the routes. And, due to the construction of the return
function, the optimal strategy for Player A at stage one
is any possible strategy . Due to the unique minimum
achieved by Player B, Player A cannot affect the outcome of
the first stage.
It becomes readily apparent that this result will hold
for the entire problem. Consider
1 1
/ / CB1 (A,B)dF(x 1 )dG(y i )
h
1
(A,B) = Max Min ^j^j
F G
/ / C* (A,B)dF(x, )dG(y.)
X 1
1 1
// [C (x ,y k)+Cr . (A,B)]dP(x,)dG(y.)n (~| D 1 1 Dl-1 1 1







A1 _ 1(A,B)+d]dF(x 1 )dG(y 1 )
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Since Player B can always limit the casualties he has sus-
thtained on all of the previous routes to zero, the i stage
relation becomes
1 1
/ / CB (x 1 ,y i ;K)dP(x 1 )dG(y i )
h.(A,B) = Max Min ° °
F G
/ / [C (x y -k) + d]dP(x. )dG(y,
)
x 1 1
which is the problem which was solved for the first stage.
The solution to the game is therefore easily seen. If
the objective of the insurgent is to minimize the casualty
ratio in favor of the counter-insurgent, the optimal
strategy is to send, with probability one, no forces
through the infiltration network. The optimal strategy for
the counter-insurgent is any strategy he desires. The value
of the game, the expected casualty ratio in favor of the
counter-insurgent, is zero. The implications which can be
made about the model from this result will be investigated
in the succeeding chapter, and some modifications will be
proposed.
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V. THE MODIFIED PROBLEM AND SOLUTION
In the preceding section it was shown that the optimal
strategy for the insurgent in the allocation game was to
avoid the use of the network entirely if his objective was
to minimize the casualty ratio in favor of the ambush or
counter-insurgent force. The expected value of the casualty
ratio is then zero, which is the value of the game. This
result, though mathematically correct for the model given,
is not appealing since the insurgent may have goals which
a°e not adequately represented by the payoff function which
was used. In this section an additional modification will
be made in the return function to represent the case in
which the insurgent wishes to maximize the men infiltrated
through the area. A solution for the new game will be
determined, and the solution will be compared with the
previous result.
A. MODIFICATION OF INSURGENT RETURN
The result which was obtained in the preceding section
is the obvious solution for an insurgent with complete
freedom of choice in the actions he can take. One of the
major tenets of guerrilla warfare is for the insurgent to
maintain the initiative and to avoid contact when this
initiative is lost. Thus an insurgent with a set of infil-
tration routes which are being ambushed or patrolled by the
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opposing force would avoid using those routes if he were
free to do so.
The insurgent, however, may not always be able to com-
pletely abandon such an infiltration network. As was noted
in the introduction of this paper, the level of hostilities
which the insurgent can maintain in his chosen area of
operations may depend to a large extent on the amount of men
and materiel which can be infiltrated from the insurgent
base areas or sanctuaries. In such cases the insurgent may
continue to use routes which are being heavily interdicted
by the opposing force. This has been the result in the
Vietnam conflict in which the insurgent forces have con-
tinued and in some instances increased the use of their
supply routes through the border areas of Laos and South
Vietnam despite intense aerial interdiction [13]. It will
be shown that the general game formulation used to analyze
the original allocation problem can be extended to cover
these new situations.
One method of extending the present model would be to
place a lower bound on the forces which the insurgent could
commit to the infiltration routes. This approach would be
only partially successful, since it can be shown that the
expected casualty function for Player B,Cg(x,y), is convex
in y for all allocations x of Player A. Thus the insurgent
would profit by committing only those forces required by
the constraint. Although the solution of such a game would
provide the optimal allocation for those forces among the
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different infiltration routes, it would not determine what
total force allocation would be optimal unless the game were
solved for all possible lower bounds. Furthermore, such a
model would not accurately reflect the true goal of the
insurgent which is not to minimize casualties but to maxi-
mize the number of men successfully infiltrated.
A better method is to redefine the return function to
accurately reflect the outcomes which the insurgent wishes
to optimize. There are essentially two results from a play
of the game. For each allocation made by Player B some
fraction may traverse the network successfully. In addition,
some portion is lost in casualties. The insurgent wishes to
maximize the men through the system and minimize the casual-
ties lost. Although these two objectives are usually
incompatible there may be some tradeoff between them, a
measure of which can be gained with the weighted difference
of the two. Therefore, let the "worth" to the insurgent of
one man who successfully travels the network be c-, and let
the "cost" of one casualty to the force be c~. Then a can-






(x,y) - c^y - C
B
(x,y)],
where x and y are the allocations of the two players to the
route in question and C R (x,y) is the casualty function




of one casualty is half the worth c-^ of a
successful Infiltration, then the expression can be reduced
to
Cg(x,y) = C R (x,y) - y .
This new individual return CR (x,y) is always non-positive
and Player B will seek to minimize it over his range of
choice y e [0,1]. Although this new return no longer repre-
sents a pure casualty function, it can be used in much the
same manner as the original C R (x,y).
It is easily shown that the revised return function,
CR (x,y), has the same properties with respect to Player B
as the earlier casualty function, namely continuity. If
at
the individual return for Player A,C.(x,y), is assumed to
be the same expected casualty function defined earlier,
then the two functions can be used to define a new criterion
R (x ,y, ) = —
C*(x.,y.)
where, as before, x. and y. are the respective allocations
of Player A and Player B to the i infiltration routes,
with these allocations representing portions of the total
available force. The revised individual return functions




The new multi-stage game is stated using recurrence
equations similar to those of Section IV, but utilizing
at
the new criterion function R (x,y). Define





(x,y) - C*(x1>yi ) + cJiM (T(*,B»






1 ,y 1 )
C*
3
.(x 9 y) = C*(xlsy.) + cJ^SU.B))
i = 2,...,n .
where T(A,B) and S(A,B) are as defined earlier. Then the
recurrence equations are





/ / c"(x, ,y..)dF(x, )dG(y
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/ / C* .(x,y)dF(x,)dG(y.)
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X ±




The same mathematical arguments which were used to
justify the decomposition of the original game can be used
on the modified game to the same end. The recursive solu-
tion of this new game will yield the optimal strategies
for both players and the value of the game.
TABLE II





(x,y) Cg(x,y) R (x,y)
x = d -y y
d
2 , / 2 ,,, v - / y -(1/k)x






x > Ky Ky + d
y = d
where k = k(A,B) = po" ~a~
B. SOLUTION
In the solution which follows a great deal of use will
be made of a class of discontinuous distribution functions
first introduced in Section III. These functions will be
rigorously defined, and some conditions on the factor of
proportionality k will be investigated before a solution
is attempted.
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1. Step Functions With One Step
Suppose there is a finite increasing sequence of
points of [0,1]
x-, < x~ < ... < x
1 d n
such that a distribution function F has discontinuities at
each of these n points but is constant elsewhere. That is
F(u) = F(v) if x. < u,v < x.^
n .l ' l + l
Then F will be called a step function with n steps. The
distribution which will be especially useful will be the
step functions of one step. Such distributions will be
written as I , which will denote a distribution function
c
which has a step of one unit at the point c. Thus
I
c
(x) =0 x<c c>0







(x) =1 x > .
It can be easily shown that any step function of n steps
F(x) can be written as a sum of n single step distribution
function such that
F(x) = w,I + w I + ... + w I
1 x, 2 x n x1 n
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where x, ,Xp,...,x are the step points of the original






w. = P(x. ) - P(x. -. ) i > 1.
1 l l-l
2 . Parametric Considerations
Two functions which will figure in the subsequent
solution are the individual returns when both players employ
their entire resources along a single infiltration route.
These returns are determined by the initial resources of
the two players, A and B, and the Lanchester attrition rate







The behavior of the individual returns C.(l,l) and CR (1,1),
where each player commits his entire force, will be studied
for three cases.
(1) K > 1.
If this is the case, then an engagement to which both
players commit their entire initial resources will always
result in a win for Player B, the insurgent, and the func-
tions of interest are
C*(l,l) = 1 + d








(2) k < 1
The result in this case would be a win for Player A,
for the same reasons given above. Therefore
C*(l,l) = k + d
C*(l,l) =
R*(l,l) = .
(3) k - 1
This condition implies that an engagement to which both
players commit their entire forces will result in a draw,
that is, neither side will lose, and
C*(l,l) = 1 + d
C*(l,l) =
R*(l,l) = .
This final case will be assumed in the subsequent solution
process which implies that the two forces are tactically
equivalent at the start of the game in the sense of equiva-
lence defined by Lanchester.
59
3 . Specialized Solution
The problem at the first stage of the game is to
solve









1 ,y 1 )dF(x,)dG(y. 1 )A i i i i
Consider the problem first of Player B with regard to the
numerator of the return function. The individual return,
it
C R (x. ,y-,) is minimized by maximizing y, for all allocations
X-, of Player A. The maximum value of y, is one, and
therefore
1 1 11




R ( Xl ,i)dP(x 1 ) .B 1 1
; consider the insurgent's problem with respect to the
denominator, C
A
(x-,,y.). Since the return to Player B is
nonpositive for all allocations of the two players, and
since he wishes to minimize the overall return function
R-i( x >y)j he wishes to minimize the denominator C.(x.,,y,),
which is positive for all values in its range. But this








) = / / C A (x 1 ,y ]_) dP(x1)dI o (y -J






= / C?(x-, ,0)dF(x, ) .
Obviously, no pure distribution will accomplish the
overall minimization of the return function R,(x,y) for
Player B. It can be shown that the optimal solution under
the assumption that k = 1 is for the insurgent to play a
mixed strategy, with regard to the first route, of
g°(y
1 )
= d-* 1 )i (y 1 ) + ^ 1 i 1 (y 1 ) < <\> 1 < 1 .
If this strategy is used, then
11 1 1
/ / C*(x
n ,y n )dF(x n )dG( yi ) / / CR (x n ,y n )dF(x 1 )dG°(y n )
M .
B 1 1 1 1 B 1 X
m 11- 1 1 *
/ / C*(x, ,y.,)dF(x, )dG(y,) / / C, ( x, ,y , ) dF( x, ) dG°(y )
00 00
















The counter-insurgent player then wishes to maximize
H(x^) as defined above, by choosing some distribution func-
tion from D 1# The same method of analysis used for Player
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B will be used to determine the optimal strategy for Player
Since he wishes to maximize the overall function he will
at
to maximize the numerator, CgCx-^l). He can increase
the casualties to the insurgent by increasing the ambushing
force, x
1











/ CB (x 1 ,l)dI 1 (x1 )
= ^C^Q.l)
.
where I-,(x) is a step-function as defined earlier. At the
same time, Player A wishes to minimize his own casualties,





















As above, the optimal strategy F (x.) for Player A assuming
k = 1 is to play a combination of the two strategies I( x
-i)
and I-. ( X-. ) , and
F°(x
1






























Vl C a (1j1) + d " (|) l^l d
But it was shown above that, under the assumption that k = 1,
C*(l,l) = 1 + d
C R (1,1) = .
Therefore, substituting above
h: = Max H(x )
F
* 1 ^ 1
+ d
The second stage problem is then
1 1
*




= Max Min ~j
G





















By the same analysis used at stage 1, it ; shown that





I Q (x 2 ) + ^ 2 I l (x 2 )
G°(y
2 )
= (1-<J> 2 )
I (y 2 ) + <P 2 1 1 (y 2 ) '
A similar result will occur for each stage of the game, a
mal strategies will be for each player to play











G°( yi ) = (i-* 1 ) i Q (y ± ) + ^ 1 ^ 1 (y i ) o < * ± < i .
where F (x.) is the marginal distribution for x. in the
joint distribution F (x), and where G (y.) is the marginal
distributic y. in G (y).
The values of \p . and
<J>
. are determined follov
manner. Since the numbering system for the arcs is arbi-
trary all arcs are equally useful and accessible
each ; the condition of symmetry holds and
and
$ = d> = ... d>










+ ... + <|>
n
= 1
The solution to these sets of equations is
r i y i n
Therefore the optimal strategy for each player in the case
where k = 1, is to commit his entire force to a single
infiltration route and to choose that route in a completely
random fashion .
The value for h*, which is the value of the game, can
be found from
n







The true meaning of this value is not clear since the mod-
ified objective function was of composite form. The
expected casualty ratio can be calculated easily. The
probability that both players choose the same route on any
pgiven play of the game is iK x
<J>.
= 1/n since each player
chooses independently. In such an engagement both forces
will be destroyed, and the ratio will thus be B/A . There-
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casual determined before of ie time,
the throi network fc nt is greatly
creased, low pe eing
Low through network) = B - ECC^)
D
I
where n is the number of arcs throi m. This is
a definite inc o floi :eding
example
.
the next section the impo imptions
made in the oment i-
tivity of the solutions to changes in the
be inv rt addl ' extensions of
;>del , and s lems
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The original objective of this study as outlined in the
introductory remarks was the development of a realistic
allocation model to be used in conducting ambush interdic-
tion of infiltration routes. A game theoretic model was
then proposed, and a method for obtaining the optimal
allocation strategies for the two players was presented.
This method was then used to determine those best strategies
for two special cases. In this section the degree to which
the original objective was accomplished will be examined
and the importance of some of the major assumptions will be
discussed. Also, the manner in which the model can be
extended to other situations will be mentioned, and some
areas of future work will be suggested.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
The model which has been developed in the preceding
sections does provide a method of allocating the forces of
two opponents in an infiltration situation which optimizes
the allocations of each under certain assumptions. The
significance of the results, however, depends to a large
degree on the nature of the assumptions made in deriving
them. Two of the major assumptions which determined the
form of the results were that a gaming model was appropriate
for the situation being studied and that the ratio of the
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non-zero sum games. The theorem stated in Section III and
proved in Appendix A shows that a similar ratio can be used
for continuous non-zero sum games, but whether or not to
accept this criterion is a matter of individual taste.
Its use was originally proposed because the classic criteria
did not apply for the reason mentioned above and because
the desired return function, the ratio of expected casual-
ties, was itself a ratio. However, with the extension of
the original method to account for the major goal of the
insurgent, that of maximizing the men successfully infil-
trated through the area of operations, the desirability
of the ratio criterion is not easily demonstrated. Though
the new criterion function does attempt to model the
individual return to the insurgent it ignores the real goal
of the counter-insurgent which is the interdiction of the
infiltration operations.
Consider the two solutions which were determined in
this paper for the two forms of the criterion function.
The solution of the first case yielded a ratio of casualties
of zero, with no infiltration being accomplished by the
insurgent. For the second case the solution yielded a
ratio of expected casualties which was considerably greater
than unity with the assumption of tactical equivalence of
the two forces, and consequently represented a significant
improvement in the Individual return to the counter-
insurgent player. But at the same time, the number of men
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nature of the original allocation process. In addition,
some infiltration situations which are not covered by the
present model can be covered by the relaxation of some
of the assumptions made in the original formulation.
1
.
Ambush Versus Meeting Engagements
In some situations the operations of the counter-
insurgent may not be limited to the ambushing of infiltra-
tion routes, but may include offensive operations of
different types. In these situations the counter-insurgent
must allocate forces among a number of dissimilar alter-
natives, and the need for a planning model is increased.
These non-homogeneous allocation processes can be analyzed
with the present model by allocating all forces to a type
of operation at a single stage of the game. The return
for that stage would be the value of a sub-game of the
type discussed in this paper, which would allocate forces
between all feasible alternatives of a single type. Return
functions for situations other than ambush could be deter-
mined using Lanchester models or other means.
2. The Critical Survival Level
One of the assumptions made in developing the
expected casualty functions for the present model was that
the critical survival levels m and n were both zero. These
maximum survival levels at which a side will break contact
are seldom zero in guerrilla conflicts, especially for the
guerrilla force. Non-zero critical survival levels could
71
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is the determination of the solution of the game in the
preceding section when the opposing forces are not stra-
tegically equivalent, that is, when k ? 1. The optimal
strategies in such a case are not of the simple form shown,
and a detailed analysis of their form is needed. The vari-
ation of the optimal strategies for the players with
changes in the initial forces for each could then be
determined.
Additional problems have already been noted in the
discussion of the individual return functions and in the
extensions mentioned above. Furthermore, the general nature
in which the game was formulated may permit the modeling
of other, possibly non-military, allocation situations if
the form of the criterion function is reasonable.
D. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, an allocation problem associated with
counter-infiltration operations in guerrilla warfare has
been investigated and a game theoretic planning model has
been proposed. In addition, the model has been used to
determine the optimal allocation policy for two specialized
cases of the basic conflict situation. It is hoped that
this study will be useful to planners involved in counter-
infiltration and will generate interest in the further
investigation of the problem.
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PROOF. For simplicity we shall abbreviate FeD and GeD
as F and G , and dF(x) and dG(x) as dF and dG. Define a
function





- = Max Max / / L(x,y)dFdG + n
Y F G
and n is a small, positive real number. Then
11 11
' / L*(x,y)dFdG = y f ./ /L(x s y)dFdG
< m < 1 for all F,GeD.
From McKinsey's fundamental theorem of continuous
games, [7] ,
11 11
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Define the recurrence relation
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The condition < 1 - / / L (x,y)dFdG < 1 - d < 1 yields
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/ / K(x,y)dFdG / / K(x,y)dFdG
Max Min ^p^ = Mln Max ^^j ,
F G
f f L(x,y)dFdG F f f L(x,y)dFdG
which was the original hypothesis to be proved.
The preceding proof is an extension of an approximation
method developed by Bellman [2] . Bellman proved a similar
result for non-zero sum discrete games and discussed the
possibility of using the ratio of individual returns as a
criterion function for the evaluation of the optimal stra-
tegies for the game. The present extension shows the same
method can be used to analyze no-zero sum continuous games.
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